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This Article considers notable developments in Indiana family law during the
survey period of October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017. The published appellate
cases considered regard property division upon divorce, parenting time and
visitation, child custody, child support, paternity and adoption, CHINS and the
termination of parental rights, and jurisdiction and procedure.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION
On property division matters arising during the survey period, an Indiana
appellate court found that a husband was not entitled to credit for money he
withdrew from a brokerage account that he could not prove he spent on marital
expenses.1 At the time of the divorce, the parties had significantly disparate
incomes favoring the husband, and the husband withdrew $470,000 from a
brokerage account that he claimed was to cover marital expenses.2 However, the
husband was unable to account for $93,000 of these funds, so the trial court
awarded the wife 55% of the marital estate.3 The trial court further denied the
husband credit for the payments he made benefiting the family during the pending
divorce proceedings.4 The appellate court affirmed, finding sufficient evidence
supporting the lower court’s decision.5 
In another case, an Indiana appellate court determined that a wife was entitled
to actual investment accounts, and not merely their valuation at the time of
dissolution.6 When dividing the marital property, the trial court awarded the wife
55% of the assets, including her entitlement to the investment accounts.7 The wife
filed a subsequent motion with the trial court because the husband failed to
distribute the investment accounts to her.8 The husband argued that the valuation
of the accounts had risen significantly since the dissolution and she was not
entitled to that additional money.9 The trial court agreed with the husband,
determining that its previous judgment had awarded the wife the valuation of the
accounts and not the accounts themselves, and awarded the wife a monetary
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1. Priore v. Priore, 65 N.E.3d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
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3. Id.
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6. Deen-Bacchus v. Bacchus, 71 N.E.33d 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
7. Id. at 883.
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9. Id. at 884.
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amount based on the value of the accounts at the time of the divorce.10 The
appellate court reversed, finding that the divorce order granted the wife the
investment accounts themselves.11
In another case, the appellate court determined that a wife was not entitled to
the value of stock options that did not vest until after the parties’ final separation
date.12 The appellate court further held that the trial court had erred in its
inconsistent treatment of stock options as an asset or income.13 
An Indiana appellate court also reiterated that all marital property goes into
the marital pot to determine equitable distribution during a dissolution.14 In this
case, the trial court had excluded the husband’s entire pension from the marital
estate, awarding it to the husband.15 The appellate court overruled, finding that
while a court may award a marital asset solely to one party, that asset must still
be considered as part of marital property for purposes of determining the value
of marital assets.16
In contrast, property is excluded from the marital estate when the parties had
a prenuptial agreement specifying that the wife did not have an interest in the
property.17 In Layne, the appellate court affirmed that a valid prenuptial
agreement covered the marital residence, despite the fact that the marriage did not
take place until seven years after the prenuptial agreement.18 The appellate court
also found that the trial court did not err in awarding the wife $91,000 to equalize
the dissipation resulting from the $182,000 payment that the husband made to his
daughter just before formally separating from the wife.19 The appellate court
noted that “a trial court may compensate a spouse for pre-separation dissipation
of marital assets as long as such compensation comes from marital assets in
which the parties have a vested present interest at dissolution.”20
In another case, an ex-husband had opened two tax-advantaged college
savings accounts for a child during the parties’ marriage.21 At the time of divorce,
the accounts remained the ex-husband’s property and he added to them.22 Several
years later, the ex-wife filed a petition to compel the ex-husband to contribute
toward their child’s college education.23 While he conceded a support obligation,
the ex-husband appealed the trial court’s decision to make the ex-wife a joint
10. Id.
11. Id. at 885.
12. Fischer v. Fischer, 68 N.E.3d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
13. Id. at 610.
14. Quinn v. Quinn, 62 N.E.3d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
15. Id. at 1218-19.
16. Id. at 1223.
17. Layne v. Layne, 77 N.E.3d 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
18. Id. at 1258.
19. Id. at 1262, 1264.
20. Id. at 1264. 
21. Miller v. Brown, 83 N.E.3d 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
22. Id. at 1253. 
23. Id.
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owner of the savings.24 The appellate court determined that the trial court could
not order joint ownership of the accounts, but noted that the trial court did have
the ability to set aside part of the ex-husband’s property to ensure that he met his
child support obligations.25
II. PARENTING TIME & VISITATION
Regarding parenting time during the survey period, an Indiana appellate court
found that a trial court erred in requiring the father to obtain the mother’s consent
before enrolling their children in an extracurricular activity during his parenting
time.26 In that case, the parties had significant difficulties co-parenting and the
mother had sole legal custody of the children.27 The appellate court found that it
was within the father’s right to enroll the children in appropriate extracurricular
activities without the mother’s consent when such activities did not infringe on
the children’s time with their mother.28 
Regarding non-traditional work schedules, an Indiana appellate court
remanded a case on parenting time to use the parties’ current work schedules.29
The parents were initially awarded relatively equal parenting time, but the
mother’s unconventional nursing schedule had created an unequal visitation
allotment.30 In setting forth the parenting time schedule, the trial court had
allotted additional time to the father because of the mother’s previous twelve-hour
work shift that ended at 9 p.m.31 However, her current work schedule ended at 6
p.m.32 The appellate court noted that while still a twelve-hour shift, the difference
between an end time of 9 p.m. and 6 p.m. was significant enough to remand.33
The appellate court also found that the trial court had erred in allowing
grandparents summer visitation over parental right-of-first refusal.34
In another case, the appellate court had to determine the visitation rights of
extended paternal relatives after the divorced father committed suicide.35 While
the child’s paternal grandmother received visitation rights, the trial court specified
that other paternal relatives could also visit with the child during the
grandmother’s visitation time and could speak with the child during phone
conversations with the grandmother.36 Due to her contentious relationship with
24. Id. at 1254.
25. Id. at 1256.
26. J.W. v. M.W., 77 N.E.3d 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
27. Id. at 1276. 
28. Id. at 1280.
29. D.G. v. S.G., 82 N.E.3d 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
30. Id. at 350.




35. In re Visitation of G.S. v. M.S., 69 N.E.3d 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
36. Id. at 501.
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those relatives, the mother objected.37 The appellate court reversed the visitation
with relatives other than the grandmother because they fell outside the scope of
the Grandparent Visitation Act.38
In another unconventional visitation matter, an Indiana appellate court
reversed the visitation rights of a mother’s ex-boyfriend.39 The mother and
daughter had moved into the ex-boyfriend’s home when the daughter was an
infant.40 The couple subsequently had a child together and separated several years
later, never having married.41 The appellate court found that the trial court had
abused its discretion in awarding the ex-boyfriend visitation with the mother’s
daughter.42 The ex-boyfriend did not present evidence sufficient to overcome the
presumption that the mother’s decision to terminate visitation with a non-parent
was in the child’s best interest.43 
III. CHILD CUSTODY
A notable child custody case arose during the survey period that focused on
the impact of a vaccination disagreement on joint legal custody.44 The parties
entered into an Agreed Decree of Paternity wherein they shared joint legal
custody of their child, requiring the mother to seek the father’s input on major
medical, religious, and educational decisions, and further requiring that the child
be vaccinated if the child would otherwise be denied enrollment into school.45
The child was not vaccinated at birth, but was required to be vaccinated to attend
kindergarten unless the parents claimed a religious objection.46 The father refused
to sign the documents claiming the objection and the mother did so without his
permission.47 The situation was further complicated when the father had a
subsequent infant that was unable to be vaccinated for health reasons; doctors
recommended that the infant not be around unvaccinated individuals, including
the parties’ child.48 
The father filed a motion for contempt and sought to modify legal custody
solely related to medical decisions.49 The appellate court found that the specific
language of the parties’ decree required vaccinations if the child’s school did,
37. Id.
38. Id. at 502. 
39. Brown v. Lunsford, 63 N.E.3d 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
40. Id. at 1058.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1065. 
43. Id. 
44. G.G.B.W. v. S.W., 80 N.E.3d 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
45. Id. at 267.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 268.
49. Id. 
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regardless of any possible statutory exemptions.50 Accordingly, the trial court had
abused its discretion in not finding the mother in contempt and in not modifying
legal custody of medical decisions in favor of the father.51
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
Several notable child support issues arose during the survey period. One such
issue emerged out of Priore v. Priore, discussed above in relation to property
division.52 In Priore, the father alleged that the trial court had abused its
discretion in ordering the parents to pay for their daughter’s graduate school.53 At
the time of the decision, the daughter was enrolled in a six-year physician
assistant program, from which she would graduate with both bachelor’s and
master’s degrees.54 The appellate court agreed that the trial court had abused its
discretion in extending the parents’ child support obligation beyond the
daughter’s undergraduate education, and remanded to the trial court to amend the
decree, limiting the support obligations to educational expenses related to the
bachelor’s degree.55
An Indiana appellate court also considered a child support case on Social
Security Income (“SSI”), which does not constitute income for purposes of
calculating child support.56 In that case, the father asserted that the trial court
erred in increasing his child support obligations after he became ineligible for
Social Security Disability and began receiving SSI.57 Although the father gave
untimely notice of appeal, the appellate court agreed to hear the appeal given the
extraordinarily compelling reason to restore his right to appeal.58 The appellate
court concluded that the modification clearly violated Indiana’s Child Support
Guidelines because SSI was intended to provide the recipient with the bare
minimum needed to sustain himself.59 
Another case considered imputed income in an instance of voluntary
underemployment.60 In the matter, the trial court found that the father was
voluntarily underemployed given his decision to undergo part-time undergraduate
studies and forgo full-time employment.61 The trial court therefore imputed to
him an income of $600 per week.62 Although the appellate court noted the great
50. Id. at 270.
51. Id. at 270-271.
52. 65 N.E.3d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
53. Id. at 1075.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Cannon v. Caldwell, 74 N.E.3d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
57. Id. at 256.
58. Id. at 258-59.
59. Id. at 259. 
60. Miller v. Miller, 72 N.E.3d 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
61. Id. at 953.
62. Id. at 954.
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latitude afforded to trial court decisions,63 it remanded for failure to consider
prevailing job opportunities and earning levels in the community.64 
Finally, in a case regarding over twenty years of child support arrears, the
question arose of retroactive modification and the impact of another person’s in
loco parentis status.65 After a divorce, the father disappeared without notice and
had no further contact with the mother or their two children.66 The mother
subsequently remarried and the children’s stepfather began to act in loco
parentis.67 Twenty years after the divorce, the mother filed a motion to determine
child support arrearage, and the trial court found arrears of approximately
$150,000.68 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of retroactive
modification of the father’s child support order, finding that no equitable or
public policy exception applied.69 The appellate court further found that while a
person acting in loco parentis may incur support obligations in limited
circumstances, he does not alleviate a biological parent from support
obligations.70
V. PATERNITY & ADOPTION
Several significant paternity and adoption cases arose during the survey
period. In one such paternity case, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
finding that a husband was equitably estopped from rebutting the presumption
that he was not the child’s father.71 During their divorce proceeding, the parties
stipulated that the child was not the husband’s biological child.72 However, the
husband had decided to raise the child as his own and had done so for twelve
years, having asked the wife not to tell the biological father of her pregnancy,
seek support from him, or file a paternity action.73 At the time of the divorce, the
trial court ordered the husband to pay child support and the husband appealed.74
The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision, stating that equitable
estoppel was appropriate because the child would otherwise suffer a significant
loss of support.75 The appellate court further relied on public policy principles
that would not support leaving the child essentially fatherless.76
63. Id.
64. Id. at 955-57.
65. Elwood v. Parker, 77 N.E.3d 835 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
66. Id. at 836.
67. Id. at 837. 
68. Id.
69. Id. at 838.
70. Id.
71. Sheetz v. Sheetz, 63 N.E.3d 1077 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
72. Id. at 1079.
73. Id. at 1078. 
74. Id. at 1079. 
75. Id. at 1082-83.
76. Id. at 1083.
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An Indiana appellate court also determined that a natural father convicted of
molesting another child did not need to grant consent to a stepfather adoption.77
During that adoption proceeding, the mother testified that the natural father
molested her older child from a previous relationship with their child in the
room.78 He spent three years in prison and had a no contact order, so that at the
time of the adoption proceeding, he had not seen the child in over four years.79 He
admitted that he had not sought reunification with the child, despite the divorce
decree stating that he was required to request visitation after his release from
prison.80 He also did not attempt to support the child despite having a job.81 The
appellate court affirmed that his consent to the adoption was not statutorily
required because there was clear and convincing evidence that he was unfit and
it was in the child’s best interest that the trial court dispensed with the consent
requirement.82
Under different circumstances, a court of appeals found that a mother’s
consent to an adoption was not required.83 In this case, the mother was the child’s
primary physical custodian for the first ten years of the child’s life.84 However,
after a paternity proceeding, the parties modified custody so that they shared legal
custody, with the father assuming primary physical custody and the mother being
responsible for initiating visitation.85 The mother initiated visitation with the child
one time after the modification, a year after which the stepmother filed a petition
for adoption.86 The trial court ruled that the mother’s consent for the adoption was
not required, and the mother appealed.87 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision, finding that the mother lacked significant contact with the child
for the past year.88 However, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court
on the consent determination and remanded for further proceedings, noting that
“the destructive tentacles of the substance abuse epidemic continue to reach every
corner of our State.”89 The Indiana Supreme Court determined that the mother
was justified in not communicating with her child during that one-year period
given her struggles with addiction and her good-faith recovery efforts.90
Finally, during the survey period, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution required Arkansas to list both same-sex spouses on a child’s birth
77. In re Adoption of D.M., 82 N.E.3d 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
78. Id. at 355-56.
79. Id. at 355.
80. Id. at 356-57. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 361.
83. In re Adoption of E.B.F. v. D.F., 79 N.E.3d 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
84. Id. at 395.  
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 396.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 399-401. 
89. In re Adoption of E.B.F. v. D.F. (Ind. Mar 23, 2018).
90. Id.
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certificate.91 The decision has implications for similar cases in Indiana.
VI. CHINS & THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Indiana continues to experience heightened levels of CHINS cases, and a
number of significant cases arose during the survey period related to CHINS and
the termination of parental rights. For example, a mother appealed the termination
of her parental rights on the grounds that the Department of Child Services
(“DCS”) filed its termination petition prematurely because the child had been
removed from her home for less than the statutorily required thirteen months.92
In reality, DCS had filed its initial CHINS petition and had removed the child
from the home in January 2014 after a meth lab explosion in the home.93
However, when it became clear that the fact-finding hearing would not occur
within the statutorily required 120-day period, DCS and the mother had agreed
to dismiss the petition and refile it under a new number in May 2014.94 The
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s termination of parental rights, finding
that the child’s removal occurred in January 2014 because the mother knowingly
agreed to the refiling and knew that the child had been removed in January
2014.95
In a mother and father’s joint appeal of the termination of their parental
rights, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the
mother’s parental rights, but reversed and remanded as to the father, who was not
under a dispositional decree for the statutorily required six-month minimum
period.96 The child was removed from the mother’s care shortly after birth
because of the mother’s admitted drug use during pregnancy.97 Parental rights
were terminated approximately fifteen months later.98 The father was in prison for
all but three months of this time, and four months before terminating parental
rights, the juvenile court acknowledged that the father’s dispositional hearing
would not occur until his release from prison.99 The appellate court therefore held
that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights.100
In another case, an appellate court rejected a mother’s argument that the trial
court had erroneously terminated her parental rights. The trial court had found
that DCS was not required to undertake reasonable efforts to reunite the mother
with four of her minor children.101 While the appellate court acknowledged that
91. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
92. In re L.R., 79 N.E.3d 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
93. Id. at 986-87.
94. Id. at 987. 
95. Id. at 989.
96. In re G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
97. Id. at 901.  
98. Id. at 901-02.
99. Id. at 903.
100. Id. at 904.
101. S.G. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Services (In re S.G.), 67 N.E.3d 1138 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
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generally DCS is required to undertake such reasonable efforts, it noted that such
efforts are not required under the No Reasonable Efforts Statute when the
mother’s parental rights to previous children had been involuntarily terminated.102
In this instance, the mother’s parental rights to several children were terminated
because of physical abuse and neglect.103 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights again in this case,
finding that the state had a compelling interest in preventing the children from
additional physical and emotional harm, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the No Reasonable Efforts Statute.104 The court further denied mother’s
contention that the No Reasonable Efforts Statute was unconstitutional and void
for vagueness.105
An appellate court also reversed a trial court’s decision to terminate a
mother’s parental rights when the mother would return to living with the child
and husband after prison.106 Prior to her incarceration, the mother lived with her
husband and their biological child, as well as a child she had from a previous
relationship.107 The older child had no relationship with her biological father and
was raised by her mother and stepfather.108 Both parents desired to raise the two
children, but despite testimony from the children’s foster mother that the two
children were closely bonded, the court terminated the mother’s parental rights
to both children while she was incarcerated and returned the younger child to the
father’s custody.109 The appellate court reversed, stating that the trial court erred
in terminating the mother’s parental rights when DCS did not provide clear and
convincing evidence that it was in the older child’s best interests to be separated
from the younger child.110 Further, the mother should not have her parental rights
terminated when the trial court was aware that she would return to living with the
child after her incarceration.111 
In another case, the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court’s
decision to terminate parental rights based partly on inadmissible hearsay.112 At
the termination hearing, the Guardian ad Litem (“GAL”) testified regarding the
child’s opinion, and the father appealed this testimony as inadmissible hearsay.113
The appellate court agreed, noting that while the GAL was “the voice of the
children,” there was no statutory exception to hearsay rules for a GAL.114
102. Id. at 1144.
103. Id. at 1140.
104. Id. at 1146.
105. Id. at 1147.
106. In re A.W., 62 N.E.3d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
107. Id. at 1270.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1273.
110. Id. at 1275. 
111. Id. at 1274-75. 
112. In re O.G., 65 N.E.3d 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
113. Id. at 1088.
114. Id.
1094 INDIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1085
Finally, an Indiana appellate court ruled that a mother’s admission to a child
being a child in need of services (“CHINS”) was not binding on the father.115 In
the case, the father was in prison at the time of the fact-finding hearing, when the
mother admitted that the child was a CHINS.116 The appellate court determined
that one parent’s admission that a child is a CHINS is not automatically sufficient
to support a CHINS adjudication, and in this instance, DCS had not met its
burden of proving that the child was a CHINS.117
VII. JURISDICTION & PROCEDURE
In the surveyed period, numerous cases arose addressing jurisdiction and
procedure. Two decisions specifically discussed jurisdictional issues at the trial
court. In one of these cases, a wife appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss
her divorce proceeding for lack of jurisdiction after the death of the husband.118
The parties married and lived together for approximately one year in the late
1960’s, having no children before moving to separate homes and starting separate
lives.119 The wife filed for dissolution of the marriage in 2015, five years after the
husband showed signs of dementia.120 At issue was the wife’s desire to gain
access to a trust.121 The trial court dismissed the case one month later, upon the
death of the husband, and the wife appealed.122 The appellate court affirmed that
decision, finding that no equitable or legal exception overcame the rule that a
court loses jurisdiction of a dissolution upon the death of one of the parties.123
In contrast, an appellate court found that a trial court has jurisdiction over a
subsequent proceeding regarding retirement benefits awarded during a
dissolution, even after the death of one of the parties.124 In this case, the trial court
stated that it did not have jurisdiction over an emergency motion to enforce a
restraining order protecting the ex-husband’s pension and retirement benefits,
filed by the ex-wife after the death of the ex-husband.125 However, the appellate
court determined that the ex-husband’s death did not impact the court’s
jurisdiction given that the dissolution of the marriage had already occurred.126
There were also numerous procedural cases of note during the survey period.
In one such case, the appellate court determined that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting a mother’s motion to correct error because the trial court
115. In re D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
116. Id. at 980.
117. Id. at 981.
118. Riggs v. Riggs, 77 N.E.3d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).




123. Id. at 799.  
124. Edwards v. Edwards, 80 N.E.3d 939 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
125. Id. at 941.
126. Id. at 944-45.
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offered no reason for granting the motion.127 After the father successfully
petitioned the court to modify custody of the child, the mother filed her motion,
which the trial court then granted, thereby denying father’s petition.128 Noting that
the trial court granted the mother’s motion with no explanation and without a
brief from the mother to provide such explanation, the appellate court reversed
and remanded.129
A standing issue came before an appellate court when a trial court dismissed
a petition for a protective order filed by a paternal grandmother on behalf of her
grandson.130 The paternal grandmother had legal visitation rights with her
grandson since the death of her son, who was the child’s father.131 When the child
was sixteen, a physical altercation occurred between the grandmother and mother,
during which the child attempted to intervene.132 The mother was subsequently
charged with battery against the grandmother and child.133 Although DCS chose
not to file a CHINS petition after its investigation, the grandmother kept the child
in her custody and filed for a protective order against the mother.134 The trial
court eventually dismissed the protective order, finding that the grandmother did
not have standing to file the motion because she was not the parent, guardian, or
otherwise legal representative of the child.135 On appeal, the grandmother argued
that she was a representative for the child and that the trial court had erred in
applying the statutory definition of representative for medical matters, not for
protective order matters.136 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision,
determining that in the absence of a statutory definition for representative as it
relates to protective orders, the trial court could use the medical context as
guidance.137
In another case, the appellate court dismissed a mother’s attempt to appeal a
CHINS permanency planning hearing order, finding that it was not a final
appealable order.138 The mother sought to appeal the order that changed the DCS
plan from reunification to termination.139 The appellate court rejected the
mother’s contention that the order was a final appealable order.140 No evidence
supported her assertion and the court subsequently dismissed the appeal.141
127. Riggen v. Riggen, 71 N.E.3d 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
128. Id. at 421.
129. Id. at 422-23.
130. C.H. v. A.R., 72 N.E.3d 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).




135. Id. at 999.
136. Id. at 1002.
137. Id.
138. In re Tr.S., 63 N.E.3d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
139. Id. at 1067.
140. Id. at 1068-69.
141. Id. 
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In a final procedural matter, an appellate court found that a mother did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to counsel at an adoption consent
hearing.142 At the hearing, the mother appeared without counsel, informing the
court that her attorney had quit because she could not pay him.143 She requested
new counsel be appointed.144 The trial court found that she had sufficient income
to hire an attorney and proceeded with the hearing without appointing counsel.145
After the stepmother rested her case, the trial court asked the mother numerous
questions, until the stepmother objected that the trial court appeared to be acting
as an advocate for the mother, at which point the court appointed counsel for the
mother.146 When the court reconvened days later with the mother’s newly
appointed counsel, the court stated that the hearing would continue.147 The court
ultimately found that the mother’s consent was not required for the adoption.148
On appeal, the mother argued that the trial court had committed reversible error
by not appointing her counsel until after the stepmother rested her case.149 The
appellate court reversed and remanded because the mother had not voluntarily
waived her right to counsel.150 On the contrary, she had asked the trial court to
appoint counsel for her.151
In sum, during the survey period of October 1, 2016 to September 30, 2017,
the work of the Indiana courts covered various family law topics, ranging from
property division to jurisdictional issues. Further clarification in the field will
continue in future survey periods.
142. In re Adoption of C.J., 71 N.E.3d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).




147. Id.  
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 442-43.
150. Id. at 444.
151. Id. at 443-44. 
